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In transforming its centrally planned economy,
China did not experience a J-type transformation
curve like that seen in Central and Eastern Europe
in the 1990s,when Poland,Hungary and the then still
united Czech and Slovak Republics lost roughly 20
percent of their GDP.In contrast,China has enjoyed
high average annual GDP growth rates of nearly ten
percent for the last 25 years since the Deng Xiaoping
reforms commenced in 1978. In 2006 it achieved a
USD 2.7 trillion economy; the preliminary figure for
2007 GDP is USD 2.9 trillion (World Bank 2007a;
World Bank Beijing Office 2007a and 2007b). China
now represents the world’s third largest economy,
accounting for 5 percent of world GDP in 2005. For
many economists, this success story is a puzzle.
Expressed in per capita terms, China’s output is still
low. Gross national income at current market prices
(GNI) per capita stood at USD 2,000 in 2006, at the
same level as the average for the low and middle
income countries (USD 2,037) and at about 5 per-
cent of the US level. According to this measure,
China ranked 128th in the world economy in 2005.
World Bank data for 2004 indicate that 9.9 percent
of the total population lives on less than one US
(PPP) dollar per day.
Factors driving growth 
Growth occurred evenly over the last two and half
decades with high average annual real GDP growth
rates of nearly ten percent per decade (Table 1): the
preliminary figure for 2006 is
10.7 percent.However,quarterly
growth rates show a high volatil-
ity. GDP per capita has risen by
an average annual real rate of
about 8 percent since 1978 (IMF
2006a) and real wages have also
increased by 8 percent (since
1987).According to World Bank
estimates, poverty was reduced for 422 million peo-
ple in the period 1981-2001, using the criterion of
income of one US dollar per day.The two main dri-
vers of growth were exports and investment (Siebert
2007a and 2007b).
Exports as a stimulus for growth 
Exports are a major driver of economic growth in
China, amounting to 34 percent of GDP (2005).This
figure relates to exports from mainland China, i.e.
excluding exports from Hong Kong.This high export
share is unusual since large countries normally have
a much lower export share.The trade account had a
surplus of 4.4 percent of GDP in 2005 and the cur-
rent account surplus stood at 7.1 percent of GDP in
the same year; in 2006 the current account surplus
had risen to 9.5 percent of GDP. China has a world
market share of 6.8 percent, measured in terms of
merchandise trade (2005).Foreign trade is estimated
to contribute between 3 and 4 percent of GDP
growth (World Bank Beijing Office 2007b).
Chinese exports have risen in real terms at the rapid
rate of 12.4 percent since 1980, while world mer-
chandise exports have expanded at 4.9 percent over
the same period. In the period 1995 to 2005 China’s
exports rose more rapidly at 19.7 percent (World
Bank 2006a). Rising exports pulled up the economy.
They induced production, investment and employ-
ment.Note that in order to determine the increase in
real terms, i.e. in the volume of exports, nominal
export figures, given in renmimbi, have to be cor-
rected by a price deflator. Usually the trade deflator
for goods published by the Customs Administration
is applied.
Nearly all exports represent merchandise exports,
i.e. exports of goods (excluding services).Almost all
merchandise exports are produced in the manufac-
turing sector (92 percent in 2005).Yet while China is
considered to be the manufacturing workshop of the
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Table 1  
China: Real growth rates of GDP, exports and investment
a)
Source: World Bank, World Development Online Indicators, September 2007.  
  1970–1980 1980–1990 1990–2000 2000–2006 1980–2006 
GDP    6.2    9.3  10.4    9.8    9.8 
Exports   n.a.




al formation  6.8    8.6  10.6  14.5
b)  10.6
c) 
a) Geometric annual average growth rates in constant 2000 US dollar prices. Data 
for 2006 on the basis of World Bank projections. – 
b) n.a. = not available. 
–
c) 2000–2005. – 
d) 1980–2005. 
* Kiel Institute for World Economics,
Germany, and SAIS Bologna Center,
Johns Hopkins University, Italy.CESifo Forum 4/2007 53
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world, it is astonishing that its exports consist not
only of low technology products.Almost one third of
its merchandise exports (31 percent) are high tech-
nology exports. In this respect, China is playing ball
in the same league as Japan (22 percent), Korea
(32 percent), the Netherlands (30 percent), the
United Kingdom (28 percent) and the United States
(32 percent),according to the World Bank classifica-
tion (World Bank 2007c). Although China’s high
technology exports rely on considerable high tech-
nology imports and the issue of delineating high
technology exports plays a role, China’s export bas-
ket is seen to be moving up-market into higher value
goods (World Bank Beijing Office 2006b). WTO
membership (since 2001) has further improved
China’s export conditions by securing access to for-
eign markets.
Investment – the other driver 
Gross capital formation stands high at 38.7 percent
of GDP (2004), with annual average growth rates
amounting to 10.6 percent in the period 1980 to 2005
(see Table 1). Foreign direct investment (FDI) plays
an important role in total investment. In 2005, net
capital inflows of USD 68 billion were FDI (3.6 per-
cent of GDP and about 8 percent of gross capital for-
mation) – the preliminary figure for 2006 is estimat-
ed at USD 60 billion.
Among other components of GDP on the expendi-
ture side, household final consumption accounted
for 48.5 percent and general government final con-
sumption for 10.2 percent in 2004. Government
investment is included in total investment. Gross
national savings for 2005 are estimated at 47 percent
of GDP (IMF 2006b). Households presently save
close to thirty percent of their disposable income,
while firms account for the other part of gross
national savings.The difference between the share of
savings and investment in GDP, the savings-invest-
ment gap, reflects the current account surplus.
Marginal capital productivity is declining.
Entrepreneurship
An important contributor to growth is the entrepre-
neurial spirit of the Chinese. Historically, they have
been traders, and they enjoy accumulating family
wealth.These characteristics together with the tradi-
tional value orientation represent powerful incen-
tives for effort and entrepreneurship and form a
strong foundation for bottom-up developments of
individuals and municipalities; they encourage eco-
nomic agents – the entrepreneurs – to organize new
combinations of the factors of production in the
sense of Schumpeter. The Chinese seem to have
been waiting for the Deng Xiaoping reforms, ready
to exploit the options created and to embrace capi-
talism in spite of the Communist Party’s official phi-
losophy. It is no wonder that, according to a survey
conducted by the University of Maryland, the
Chinese now show a larger acceptance of the market
economy than the three large continental countries
of Europe:74 percent of the Chinese population sup-
ports the market economy compared to 36 percent
in France. Entrepreneurs of Chinese origin living
outside mainland China have also played an impor-
tant role in China’s economic growth.
The fragility of the banking sector 
Whereas the sector of state-owned firms as a whole
no longer makes losses, the banking sector is fragile.
Banks are state-owned. This applies to the four big
state-owned commercial banks as well as to twelve
joint-stock commercial banks, city and rural cooper-
ative banks, other banks and asset management
companies. Three of the state-owned commercial
banks have been partly privatized through initial
public offerings, with the state (and the state-owned
management companies) still holding about 70 to
80 percent of equity. For instance, in October 2006,
17 percent of the shares of the Industrial and
Commercial Bank of China (ICBC), the largest of
the four state-owned banks, were introduced to the
Hong Kong and Shanghai bourses in the largest
world-wide initial public offering ever, making this
institution the fifth largest bank with a market capi-
talization of USD 147 billion.In addition,8.5 percent
of its assets are held by Goldman Sachs,Allianz and
American Express. State-owned banks have chosen
strategic partners (IMF 2006b).The other two state-
owned commercial banks are the Bank of China and
China Construction Bank.The initial public offering
of the Agricultural Bank of China is pending. Asset
management companies are the vehicles through
which the government exercises its ownership rights
vis-à-vis the four state-owned commercial banks.
Each one of the asset management companies is
responsible for one of the four state-owned com-
mercial banks.
But China’s banking system is fragile. Asset quality
is poor and the capitalization of banks is low. There
is massive government intervention in the bankingsystem. Banks are not competitive in terms of inter-
national standards. As a result of monetary policy,
the liquidity of the banking system is high, banks
hold large excess reserves, inter-bank interest rates
are low and credits are expanding strongly. Fully
functioning bond and equity markets, which could
allocate savings to investment more efficiently than
bank intermediation, have not yet been developed.
Moreover,bank intermediation is subject to political
influence and competes with informal financing;
more than half of investment is self-financed.
Investing savings abroad is not a permitted option
for savers. Bank deposits are the main form of sav-
ings.1 Chinese savers seem to have confidence in the
state-owned banks. If the depositors ever lost this
confidence, a severe risk for a stable growth process
in China would arise. Thus it is essential that bank
failures leading to bank runs be prevented.
The non-performing loans, resulting from the politi-
cal pressure on banks to provide credit to inefficient
state-owned enterprises, represent a major risk. The
stock of the banking system’s non-performing loans
was estimated at about 40 percent of GDP in 2004
(Blanchard and Giavazzi 2005). Other sources put
the percentage of total bad loans in GDP at 21 and –
with a higher credibility – at 56 (Roubini and Setser
2005). The proportion of non-performing loans to
GDP fell in 2005 (IMF 2006b). However, their total
stock is still estimated at 25 percent of GDP at year-
end 2005, including 8 percent at the asset manage-
ment companies (IMF 2006b).
In the past, the government has had to recapitalize
the state banks from time to time with sizable
amounts. In 1998, the government spent USD
32.6 billion (about 31/2 percent of GDP) in order to
save the four then wholly state-owned commercial
banks (Prasad 2004).In 1999 to 2000 the government
injected about USD 169.1 billion or 14 percent of
GDP via state-owned asset management companies
into the financial sector to clean up the balance sheet
of the state-owned commercial banks (ibid.). Bad
loans of this magnitude were taken off the bank’s
books in 1999 and transferred to four asset manage-
ment companies (Roubini and Setser 2005). In 2003,
USD 45 billion or about 4 percent of GDP were used
for the same purpose. The People’s Bank of China
transferred the amount to holding companies in
order to recapitalize two of the four state-owned
banks (China Construction Bank and the Bank of
China). The banks will not convert these assets into
renmimbi but rather retain them as international
reserves. This signifies an increase in the central
bank’s balance sheet risk. In 2005, a sum of USD
15 billion was injected into the ICBC and USD 30
billion were transferred to its asset management
company. Chinese press reports indicate that a capi-
tal injection of USD 100 billion will be needed to
prepare the Agricultural Bank of China (with 24 per-
cent of its loans non-performing) for an initial public
offering.
China makes use of its international reserves to
clean up its banks’ balance sheets. Astonishingly, in
2004 China’s reserves relative to GDP amounted to
a share not too different from that of the non-per-
forming loans of the state-dominated financial sys-
tem, namely 40 percent. Viewed this way, the inter-
national reserves partly represent an insurance
against a future failure of the banking system, and
this view mitigates against condemning China’s
accumulation of international currency reserves too
harshly.
Monetary policy, balance of payments and
exchange rate policy
Money supply and inflation 
China experienced high inflation rates in the 1980s
and 1990s.For instance,the change in the consumer
price index was 19 percent in 1988 and reached its
peak of 24.2 percent in 1994. Inflation rates were
also extremely volatile. Whereas the inflation rate
was amounted to 18.3 percent in 1989, it had fallen
to a comparatively low 3.1 percent just one year
later.The price level declined in the context of the
Asian financial crisis with – 0.8 percent in 1998 and
– 1.4 percent in 1999.Compared to the 1980s,infla-
tionary pressure stemming from a considerable
increase in the money supply and strong credit
expansion was somewhat tempered in the past few
years. Consumer price inflation, driven mainly by
food prices,was between 0.26 percent (in 2000) and
3.99 percent (in 2004). Recent inflation rates have
also been far less volatile than those of fifteen
years ago. The money supply (broad money
according to the IMF definition) rose in the range
of 14.0 percent to 19.6 percent in the period 2000 to
2005 (IMF 2006b). Credit to non-state sectors
expanded in a volatile fashion in the same period
CESifo Forum 4/2007 54
Special
1 In principle, with the WTO opening of the Chinese banking sys-
tem in 2007 foreign banks should be allowed to offer non-Chinese
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with rates fluctuating between 2.1 (2001) and 
26.5 percent (2002).
An independent monetary policy is complicated by
high current account surpluses as they increase out-
side money. The Chinese Central Bank – the
People’s Bank of China – purchases foreign ex-
change and accumulates reserves. Because of the
high current account surpluses,it is necessary to ster-
ilize the monetary expansion. That is why the
People’s Bank of China sells sterilization bonds to
the state-owned banks. From 2003 to 2004 the stock
of sterilization papers increased by about 265 per-
cent, from 2004 to 2005 it increased by another
88 percent or USD 117 billion – putting the value of
the overall stock of bonds at USD 250 billion.
However,this vast increase covers only slightly more
than half of the increase in reserves. Not all of the
outside money can be sterilized. In the future, bonds
to China’s new Sovereign Wealth Fund may be used
to mop up part of the excess liquidity.
Balance of Payments 
China has registered a surplus both in the current
and in the capital account of its balance of payments
for many years.The capital account includes FDI and
portfolio flows. In 2006, the surplus in the capital
account disappeared in spite of high net FDI inflows.
China uses the surplus to accumulate reserves (Table
2). In 2006, the surplus of the current account stood
at USD 250 billion, making up 9.5 percent of GDP.
This translates into an increase of reserves of USD
247 billion. For 2007, a surplus of USD 378 billion or
11.9 percent of GDP is expected.Then total reserves
equal USD 1,428 billion,amounting to about half the
GDP.
Capital account controls
Capital flows are controlled.Though current account
convertibility has existed since 1996, the capital
account has not been liberalized. China is following
a cautious and gradual approach to capital account
liberalization, taking into consideration the fragility
of its banking system. The Asian crisis of 1997 and
other currency disruptions, like the financial crisis in
Sweden of 1992, have shown the risk of liberalizing
the capital account when the banking sector is not
sufficiently robust, i.e. when it is not adequately reg-
ulated to withstand shocks and when banks have too
much leeway in extending loans. From the point of
view of the sequencing of liberalization, it is reason-
able to make the foreign exchange rate more flexible
first and then to liberalize the capital account in a
second step.It would be risky to introduce residents’
convertibility immediately and fully.
Exchange rate policy
The exchange rate of a country in transition to a
market economy can be expected to go through two
phases. In the first phase, the transformation process
and the opening up to trade, including a sizable
reduction in import tariffs, put the export sector and
the exchange rate under pressure which depreciates
the currency. In the second phase, when the compet-
itiveness of exports has been established, apprecia-
Table 2
China’s current and capital account balances 













Annual average  
1990–2000 
+   13.3  + 15.2  – 12.8  +   15.7  – 
2001  +   17.4  +   34.8  –   4.7   +   47.5   212 
2002  +   35.4  +   32.3   +   7.5   +   75.5   286 
2003
c)  +   45.9  +   52.8
c)  + 18.0  + 116.7    403 
2004  +   68.7  + 110.7  + 26.8  + 206.2   610 
2005
d)  + 160.8  +      63  – 16.4  + 207.3   819 
2006   +    250 (9.5)
e)  –         3
f) –  +    247  1,066 
2007
g)  +  378 (11.9)
e)  –       20
f) –  +    358  1,428 
2008
g)  +  408 (10.7)
e)  –       10
f)  –  +    398  1,826 
a) Includes counterpart transaction to valuation changes. –
 b) Accumulated reserves in a specific year are not identical to the 
additions of a period plus the reserves of the previous year due to exchange rate changes. – 
c) 2003 figure includes the 
counterpart transaction to the USD 45 billion of foreign exchange reserves used for bank recapitalization. With this figure, the
capital and financial balance would show a surplus of USD 143.7 billion. – 
d)  Includes bank capitalization and foreign 
exchange swaps, estimated at USD 28.8 billion. – 
e)  Numbers in parentheses show the share of GDP in percentage. 
–
f)Including errors and omissions. – 
g) Forecast. 
Data sources: 1990-2005: IMF, International Financial Statistics, Online Database, October 2007; Forecasts: World Bank 
Office, Quarterly Update, September 2007; own calculations.tion is likely. These two phases can be observed in
China.
Throughout the 1980s and the early 1990s, the nomi-
nal and the real effective exchange rate of the ren-
mimbi depreciated sharply. The nominal rate (ren-
mimbi to the US dollar) depreciated from 1.5 in 1980
to 8.6 in 1994 (Figure 1).The real effective exchange
rate index (which is the inverse of the IMF’s real
exchange rate index) rose from 33,3 in January 1980
to 167 in June 1993, with February 2000 set equal to
100 (in contrast to the index used by the IMF, an
increase in this index denotes a real depreciation).
From 1994 to 1998, the renmimbi appreciated nomi-
nally relative to the US dollar, i.e. the RMB/USD
rate fell. It then was held steady at 8.28 until 2004.
Since 2005, the renmimbi has appreciated by
8.28 percent to a rate of 7.65 in May 2007.This looks
like a soft crawling peg to the US dollar. In real
terms, the renmimbi appreciated from 1993 to 2001,
then depreciated unsteadily until March 2007.
However, it is amazing that it has remained constant
since 2003. It has even depreciated since 2000.
China has followed a policy of pegging the renmim-
bi,attempting to keep it more or less stable or chang-
ing it only slowly. Effective June 21, 2005 the ren-
mimbi is no longer tied to the US dollar alone,but to
a basket consisting of the US dollar,the euro,the yen
and the Korean won. In addition, the Singapore dol-
lar, the British pound, the Malaysian ringgit, the
Australian dollar, the Russian rouble, the Thailand
baht und the Canadian dollar are taken into consid-
eration. The weights of the currencies in the basket
are supposed to reflect the importance of China’s
trading partners, but are not disclosed by the
Chinese central bank. Disclosure of the weights
would allow speculators to guess where the renmim-
bi might be in the future and when the central bank
is likely to intervene.In practice,each day trading on
the spot market starts with a central parity of the
renmimbi to the US dollar determined by the
weighted average of fifteen market makers appoint-
ed by the People’s Bank of China rather than begin-
ning with the closing price of the previous day.Intra-
day movements are constrained by a band of 0.3 per-
cent on both sides.
Is the renmimbi undervalued?
Determining the correct exchange rate is a tricky
issue. After all, it is a counterfactual question.
Economic forces pull the exchange rate in different
directions. Some forces clearly work in favor of an
appreciation of the renmimbi. Following the trade
flow view of the exchange rate, the high current
account surpluses of 9.5 percent of GDP in 2006
and the expected surplus of 11.9 percent of GDP in
2007 clearly suggest an appreciation of the ren-
mimbi. Following the capital flow view of the ex-
change rate, labor productivity growth and China’s
improved access to other countries’ markets also
operate in favor of an appreciation, making China
more attractive for foreign capital. Other factors,
however, would work in favor of depreciation,
among them too high an inflation rate (represent-
ing a real appreciation but requiring a nominal
depreciation) and a liberalization of the capital
account. Thus, residents’ convertibility would in-
duce market participants to hedge political risks
and let them place their savings abroad,in this way
increasing the demand for US dollars, euros and
other currencies, implying an
increased supply of the ren-
mimbi and dragging its value
down.
Consequently, the existing capi-
tal controls for residents imply
an overvalued renmimbi, i.e. the
renmimbi would depreciate
strongly with a liberalized capi-
tal account.Combining the trade
flow and the capital flow views,
the accumulation of reserves
definitively points in the direc-
tion of an appreciation. Most
importantly, it is the real ex-
change rate that determines the
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current account. Yet the real exchange rate has
remained constant since 2003 and has even depreci-
ated since 2003. China has used the international
reserves as an insurance against the fragility of its
banking system (Siebert 2007a). In any case, reduc-
ing the Chinese current account surplus will not nec-
essarily solve the US current account deficit prob-
lem. Thus, a lower Chinese surplus would raise the
world real interest rate and would hurt the US
through another mechanism (Corden 2007).
Property rights
Establishing property rights is crucial in transform-
ing a communist, centrally planned society into a
market economy. They set incentives for the eco-
nomic agents to produce, invest, innovate, save and
provide work effort. In an approach different from
the transformation countries in Central and Eastern
Europe,China has developed its property rights step
by step. They come in the form of land use rights,
ownership titles of firms and residential titles. Land
use rights are at the core; even firms need them.
Although property rights grant the right to use land,
run firms, construct, sell and use buildings and own
apartments, all these rights are subject to control by
collective authorities, most importantly collectives,
municipalities and the Communist Party. Property
rights are far different from their interpretation in
market economies.
Land use rights for individual farmers were intro-
duced in the Deng Xiaoping reforms.Land use rights
are leases on the use of land. They now are granted
for 30 years, were initially only given for one year,
then for ten and afterwards for twenty years.
However, agricultural land is owned and adminis-
tered by the collectives. According to the Land
Management Law of 1998, a contract between the
collective landowner (i.e.the collectives) and the pri-
vate farm household defines the rights and duties of
both parties (Article 14).Article 13 of the Constitu-
tion, amended in 2004, defines “citizens’ lawful pri-
vate property as inviolable”. Land use rights are
granted by political decision – they were given to
those who worked on the land and Party connections
may have played a role. The total number of land-
lease contracts is more or less rationed; there is no
primary market for land use rights. However, a thin
secondary market for land use rights exists, which
was constitutionalized in 1988 (deLisle 2004).
Farmers can rent out the land with permission, pay-
ing a fee to the collective administration. Extension
of the land use may be possible.
Land use rights do not comprise full ownership.
Land cannot be sold, nor can it be mortgaged.
Farmers do not enjoy capital gains on their land.
Ultimately,they may not be interested in investing in
their land, knowing that this land may have to be
returned to the government.Given that farmers can-
not negotiate directly with locating firms and devel-
opers,they cannot use the proceeds from selling land
for investment in firms, for moving to the city or for
financing their retirement.
Although land readjustments are restricted, farmers
are not protected when the land is allocated to
expanding firms or when it is needed for residential
construction. Compensation, if any, is low: for rural
land it is at about one tenth of the market value.
About 34 million farmers lost their land-lease con-
tracts in the period 1987 to 2001 (Lindbeck 2006).De
facto, local bureaucrats have ultimate control and
ownership of rural land.
Firm ownership is linked to the ownership of land
extending for 50 years;it thus hinges on the permis-
sion of Party officials. Owning the physical assets
that firms use for production (including the
machines and the buildings) is not sufficient to es-
tablish enterprise ownership. Urban land is admin-
istered by municipalities. Sons and daughters of the
political elite have had privileged access to land
that was used to set up firms. Private ownership of
firms depends on which sectors of the economy are
at stake and it also varies with provinces and local-
ities. Public ownership prevails in sectors where
government is the dominant producer, for instance
in energy, transportation and telecommunication.
The relationship between asset ownership and land
use rights is far from clear. If an entrepreneur has
good connections with the local or provincial gov-
ernment, land use rights may de facto not be limit-
ed in time. When there is a change in leadership,
however, this contract may be void. The relation-
ship with the former political leader and the current
leader is crucial.
Residential ownership refers to the ownership of
buildings, including private apartments. With the
permission of the political authorities,it is possible to
convert agricultural land into residential use for indi-
viduals. In contrast to rural land, residential leases
run for 70 years (some for 50 or 40 years). Propertyowners elect their landlord committees in order to
protect their property against the local Communist
Party politicians.
Property rights are far from being clearly defined;
nor are they strong.They are mushy and in constant
flux. A property right seems to exist only as long as
it is justified by economic success.The characteristics
of Chinese property rights are that they have simply
followed whatever is needed for high growth.
Property rights are rarely respected when an ex-
panding firm needs new location space, when a pri-
vate investor constructs new residential buildings or
when the government pursues an infrastructure pro-
ject. A monetary compensation requirement with
respect to real estate was introduced into the consti-
tution in 2004.Implementation of the property rights
system and of individual claim procedures is,howev-
er, far from being established. Compensation is con-
trolled by the state. Corruption is prevalent, the
court system is in development, and legal advice is
scarce.The rule of law is one of China’s institutional
deficits. A clear bankruptcy law that would allow to
sort out property claims in the event of bankruptcy
does not yet exist either.The revised bankruptcy law,
effective June 2007, attempts to partly remedy this
situation.
This form of mushy and adjustable property rights
may be appropriate for the Chinese situation in
which everything is in flux.These adaptable proper-
ty rights do seem to create enough certainty for peo-
ple to invest in the initial period of Chinese transfor-
mation, when expected yields are high. The expan-
sion of the domestic market and the opportunity to
have access to the whole world economy for the
absorption of Chinese products have over-compen-
sated the risk arising from property rights uncertain-
ty. The duration of land use rights for farmers was
extended. Auctions were introduced in 2007 to cut
down on corruption.It is,however,an open question
whether they will prevent collusion between the
administration and bidders. Property rights are
unlikely to be sufficient later on,when yields become
somewhat lower;lower expected yields require more
certainty. The approach to property rights is also
affected by the process of transforming a communist
society in which property rights are not supposed to
exist.Apparently,there are ideological constraints to
creating property rights. For instance, establishing a
rural landowning class would undo the Mao reforms
in which rural landowners were expropriated and
quite a few of them were executed.Establishing new
rights that do not jeopardize the position of the
Party is a crucial constraint. Note, however, that the
former President Jiang Zemin’s “Three Represents”
doctrine calls for the inclusion of the entrepreneurial
class – usually property owners – in the Communist
Party.
Policy issues
The crucial issue for the future is whether China’s
growth process of the last twenty five years is sus-
tainable.
Over-investment 
Over-investment in the real estate sector and in con-
struction can require a correction if an excess supply
of real estate develops.As we know from the experi-
ence in other countries, over-investment in the real
estate sector can have severe implications for the
real side of the economy.Examples are Thailand and
the Asian currency crisis of 1997 and East Germany.
An over-supply of housing and office space leads to
a fall of real estate prices,a reduction of employment
in the construction industry, and a decline in its
growth rate, often becoming negative. This lowers
the GDP growth rate. Mortgages lose in value, the
balance sheets of banks get into disarray, lending is
cut back,and a credit crunch may affect the real side
of the economy.
Normal brakes in the process of growth
Normal adjustment processes tend to reduce future
growth. As the pool of rural surplus labor becomes
exhausted and wages are no longer supported by
productivity growth at previous levels, real wages
will rise more sharply than in the past.Although the
excess supply of rural workers is estimated at
150 million and about 10 million new workers used
to join the work force each year in the past, eventu-
ally labor will become scarcer. China’s appetite for
energy and raw materials will drive up the prices of
important inputs, making production more expen-
sive. China bidding for these resources on the inter-
national markets will raise world market prices; at
present, China consumes about 8 percent of the
world’s petroleum, 27 percent of its cotton and
17 percent of its wheat (Siebert 2007). To mitigate
congestion in transportation, more resources will
have to be invested in public infrastructure projects
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which tend to have lower capital productivity than
investment in the private sector.
More importantly, weaknesses will come to the fore.
China will have to pay more attention to accidents at
the work place and in industrial production, for
instance, in the chemical industry. Moreover, envi-
ronmental constraints will make themselves increas-
ingly felt. Toxic industrial dumping in the country-
side has to be halted and existing toxic dumps have
to be cleaned up. Air and water pollution and the
deterioration of the soil become less and less accept-
able as per capita income rises. Pollution causes
social costs in terms of serious health damage. All
these factors will increase the costs of production.
According to the World Health Organization
(WHO), seven out of the ten most polluted cities in
the world are located in China.
Energy efficiency has to be increased. Retail gaso-
line prices are still lower than in the United States.
Cheap energy helps keep inflation in check, but it
distorts energy use. The Energy Information Ad-
ministration projects China’s oil demand to more
than double and reach 14.2 million barrels per day
by 2025, with net imports of 10.9 million barrels per
day. Furthermore, China is both the largest con-
sumer and producer of coal in the world. Hence
China faces major energy-related environmental
problems.
It may be argued that all these weaknesses can be
overcome with a technocratic approach and by social
engineering. However, more resources must be
diverted towards these bottlenecks, and the capital
spent on these issues will have a lower productivity,
implying a lower growth rate of the economy. In any
case, prices of land, capital, energy and the environ-
ment that falsely indicate low scarcity have to be cor-
rected through institutional changes.
Caution with data 
A word of caution is in order with respect to the sta-
tistical data (Holz 2006). In spite of the fact that the
data are subject to review by international organiza-
tions, distortions may occur because local and
regional politicians have an incentive to massage the
statistically measured results in their favor.We know
that data were heavily distorted in Central and
Eastern Europe prior to the fall of the Iron Curtain.
Moreover, statistical revision of data ex-post is com-
mon even for statistical offices of industrialized
countries. It would not be surprising if, under condi-
tions of high growth and stark structural change,
large statistical revisions were to occur in China in
the future.
Distorted resource-extensive growth
China’s growth is unbalanced in many ways: exports
and investment instead of consumption, inflationary
risk through money and credit expansion instead of
price level stability,the exchange of export goods for
international currencies and economic stimulation
instead of imports, production and investment
instead of social protection,pollution in favor of pro-
duction instead of environmental protection,and the
promotion of urban centers instead of an improve-
ment of rural areas. Gross national saving at 47 per-
cent of GDP (2005) keeps consumption low.
Monetary policy supports these distortions.
According to this view, China has followed an ineffi-
cient,resource-demanding or even resource-destroy-
ing growth path with many distortions. Factoring in
these distortions, the GDP growth rate may actually
be lower than measured statistically, say at 7.5 per-
cent per year (See sources quoted in Lindbeck 2006,
p. 25).That is why some economists are pleading for
another growth strategy with fewer distortions
(Blanchard and Giavazzi 2005; Roubini and Setser
2005). It seems likely that the normal brakes dis-
cussed above will affect the growth rate. Barring
political crises, a lower growth rate of, say, 6 percent
annually in the next twenty years is more realistic.
Such a scenario is also more likely as China’s catch-
ing-up process, in which imitation is still playing a
major role, will eventually lose steam. It would be a
different story if China were able to shift out the
technological frontier of the world itself and were
not dependent on the imitation of Western techno-
logical solutions.
Social policy constraints 
Issues of social protection have not been a major
concern in Chinese growth policy. Unemployment,
which has increased due to the restructuring of
state-owned firms, is high, given the high GDP
growth rate. The urban unemployment rate is esti-
mated at about 5 percent (Prasad 2004). Although
generous unemployment insurance has been intro-
duced for the urban unemployed, protecting about
105 million (Lindbeck 2006), other workers are not
shielded against unemployment. Protection againsthealth hazards and old-age pension insurance has
not been developed, the level of social protection in
China being similar to that of the European coun-
tries of one hundred years ago. With the decline of
the state-owned enterprises, which provided safe
jobs and human services insurance, a mixed system
has developed where,for instance,part of the health
costs are covered by firms but a large part is self-
paid. The inadequate insurance arrangements for
health and old-age are one of the reasons for high
savings. Private savings needed as a substitute for
insurance are inferior in terms of efficiency than an
insurance solution. Health insurance, for instance,
can be provided more efficiently, if a large number
of people with different health risks are insured.
Apparently,China has alternative options to follow-
ing the European social model.However,whichever
model is chosen, the need to develop a social insur-
ance system is likely to put a huge burden on the
economy.
The growing inequality of the income distribution
and the rural-urban divide represent a severe risk for
the power of the Communist Party. Discontent
among farmers due to relatively low income, the
high costs of health services, insufficient pensions in
old age and the arbitrary decisions of bureaucrats
with respect to land-use rights and local levies may
lead to social unrest in the country-side which,tradi-
tionally, has played an important role in political
change in China. Massive lay-offs in the rust belt,
toxic industrial dumping, affecting farming, fishing
and water, and industrial accidents may add to the
unrest. Social upheaval could threaten the ruling
Party.That is why rulers fear the Latin-Americaniza-
tion of the country and why they have announced
the target of a “Harmonious Society”. After all,
China lacks profound experience in social problem-
solving, compared, for instance, to India.
A banking crisis?
The Chinese banking system is fragile. As is well
known, money is not neutral. It can have a severe
effect on the real side of the economy.There have
been currency crises in the past, such as the Asian
currency crisis in the wake of which Asian coun-
tries had negative growth rates for two years, and,
of course,the Japanese bubble,as a result of which
Japan stagnating for a decade.At the heart of this
question is the issue of confidence. If the Chinese
savers, who deposited all their savings at banks,
lost their confidence, a bank run might result,
putting the hitherto stable growth process in
China at risk.
A period of positive surprises
Since the Deng Xiaoping reforms, China has experi-
enced decades of what I call positive surprises. The
economic system delivered more than people had
anticipated. At the end of each year, most people
were in a better position than they had hoped for
when the year began. This is not unlike the experi-
ence of West Germany in the 1950s and 1960s after
the Erhard reforms of 1948, when people could
afford their first bicycle, their first motorcycle, their
first car, their first vacation trip to Lake Constance
or to Bella Italia and their first apartment. Under
such circumstances it is easy to undertake economic
policies.In the future,the Communist Party will face
a different problem. The present young generation
has grown up with high expectations, is used to big
increases in real income and to a strong performance
of the economy. Unlike their fathers and grandfa-
thers, they most likely will no longer experience any
positive surprises even if the economic system con-
tinues to deliver the high GDP growth rates of the
past.
Institutional deficits 
An efficient economic system requires a reliable
institutional framework since most decisions of eco-
nomic agents need a long-run orientation. When
rules and the institutional framework for economic
decisions are lacking, economic agents are at the
mercy of bureaucrats and Party officials.Those who
have the power to decide can hand out favors,usual-
ly in return for some compensation. Corruption is
the unavoidable outcome. The rule of law therefore
is a necessary prerequisite for a sustained growth
process.
An important aspect of the rule of law is that rights
are given to private firms and households as well as
the empowerment to enforce these rights. This calls
for corruption to be pushed back and it mandates
clearer property rights. In addition, the Communist
Party must desist from intervening in administrative
and court decisions. Rules must be stable in order to
be credible. To respect human dignity goes beyond
the demand for economic freedom. All these re-
quirements may limit the power of the Party.
The actual Chinese system of governance has been
described as neo-Leninist, blending a one-party rule
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and state control of key sectors of the economy with
the market mechanism and an open economy (Pei
2006). Patronage secures support by key con-
stituents, including the bureaucracy, the military and
the business community.The question remains open
whether or not economic freedom, a necessary con-
dition for growth, will start a process in which citi-
zens eventually demand political freedom.The rela-
tionship between economic freedom and political
freedom, i.e. democracy, seems asymmetrical.
Whereas democracy is accompanied by economic
freedom (Friedman 1962), economic freedom does
not necessarily entail political freedom. A major
aspect could be that economic agents will insist on
the right to elect those who make the laws governing
economic freedom.After all, market capitalism sep-
arates economic and political power and this may
put political power on the defensive.
The biggest challenge for China may then well be the
demand for democracy.Whether or not this political
demand for democracy will be forcefully articulated
in China in the future cannot realistically be
answered at this stage. One answer is that the
Chinese derive an immense happiness from being
and becoming rich and will be satisfied (for a long
time) with a situation in which the Communist Party
just lets them get rich. In that case, economic free-
dom will be all there is. In this scenario, the govern-
ment remains more or less authoritarian. Another
possible answer is that the Communist Party will
introduce some cautious steps towards decentralized
democratic procedures, for instance letting mayors
be elected on a decentralized level.Among the polit-
ical leaders there is a fear that the Communist Party
will fall apart and the country will break up. For the
Party, the disintegration of the Soviet Union serves
as a negative example besides the Latin-Americani-
zation of social issues. The result may be a cautious
attempt of controlled capitalism, which may then
serve as a prototype for other countries like the
Arab oil countries and some developing countries.
The least likely case is the third possible answer, a
full move towards western style democracy.
Economic fundamentals may impact on the political
system and vice versa. Thus, in generating Chinese
multinationals, the issue arises of how China’s prod-
ucts are viewed abroad and whether their image por-
trays the characteristics of freedom. Social inequali-
ty may lead to political unrest. Lower growth rates
may put the political system into question,and polit-
ical turmoil may jeopardize the economic growth
dynamics of the past.An unstable China,for instance
with a growing unrest of the rural population, will
represent a threat to the world. Political rulers may
then be tempted to play with nationalist sentiment to
bolster legitimacy.It will be fascinating to watch how
China will develop.
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